it. Our people were bearing wonderfully well the strain of the prolonged War, and the cheerless military position. But if something near to starvation had assailed them and their children, the firmness of the home front might have crumbled. There were no very rosy prospects abroad to help the nation to endure acute privation at home cheerfully. Our failure to apply a more intelligent strategy had left us in a position where it became a case of holding on until one side or the other should crack. The realisation that our casualties were appalling and that results were not commensurate with sacrifices, together with the fact of the Russian Revolution, combined to create a feeling of uneasiness, especially in the industrial areas. The stories told by the crippled soldiers who had returned home from abroad constituted formidable anti-war propaganda. If hunger had visited every home the consequences might have been as serious here as they now were in Russia and afterwards became in Germany.

The powers we secured under the Corn Production Act and under the various Regulations issued under *Administrative* the Defence of the Realm Acts now gave *powers and* us authority to insist on a big increase in *machinery* cultivation of the soil ; and this on terms *created* which secured the willing co-operation of the bulk of the agricultural community, landowners, farmers and labourers. The Food

Production Department and the organisation, central and local, which it built up in concert with the Ministries of Food and of Agriculture, furnished us with an instrument for carrying through our programme.

But there were other serious fences to be cleared in our course. Chief among these were the shortage of labour and of fertilisers.